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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff-Respondent,

>

Supreme Court No. 86 0243

v.
CLINTON PERANK,

\

Priority 2

Defendant-Appellant.
REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATE OF UTAH

INTRODUCTION
R e s p o n d e n t S t a t e o f U t a h , p u r s u a n t t o a n O r d e r of t h i s

Court

d a t e d N o v e m b e r 1 0 , 1 9 8 7 , s u b m i t s t h i s B r i e f in r e s p o n s e t o t h e

Brief of Amicus Curiae Ute Indian Tribe, filed on July 21, 1988.
On August 7, 1987, the State filed witjh this Court a motion
suggesting the Court invite the Ute Tribe to give its views on
the reservation boundary issue in this casq.

Since a deter-

mination of the boundary issue could affect the Tribe and its
members, it seemed proper for the Tribe to be allowed an opportunity to express its views on that matter.

On October 7, 1987,

this Court granted the State's motion and iinvited the Tribe to
file an amicus curiae brief.
1

Rather than addressing the central isque in this case—
whether the Uintah Valley Reservation boundaries have been diminished—the Tribe chose to ignore the boundary issue in its briefr
and commented only on the secondary issue df whether or not
Appellant Perank was an Indian.

This is puzzling in light of the

importance of the boundary issue to the Tribe and its members.
In any event, for the reasons stated below„ the Tribe is incorrect in its analysis of Mr. Perankfs statug as an Indian.
ARGUMENT
1.

In its brief, the Tribe characterizes the issue of

whether or not Appellant was an Indian as the "threshold" issue
in this case (Tribe's Brief at p. 1). Not iso.

18 U.S.C. Sec-

tions 1152 and 1153 preclude State criminal) jurisdiction over
"Indians" who commit crimes within Indian Country.

Thus, in

order to divest the Utah Courts of jurisdiction, Appellant must
show that the crime was committed in Indiar} Country and that he
held the legal status of an Indian.

Neither of those require-

ments is a "threshold" issue to the other. Appellant simply must
carry his burden on both.

Perankfs Indian status is really not a

controverted issue on appeal because Perank seems to have carried
his burden of proof on his Indian status (Which was unfortunately
unrebutted in the record below).

In our view, the primary con-

troverted issue in this case is whether or not the crime was
2

committed within "Indian Country"—an issuq the Tribe has chosen
to ignore.
2.

In our primary brief we took the position that Appellant

had the burden of establishing his legal status as an Indian for
purposes of 18 U.S.C. 1152 and 1153.

Perartk submitted some

evidence supporting his claim to Indian status.

The State

presented no evidence to the contrary, and "[g]iven the state of
the record it cannot be said that Perank's status as an Indian .
. . was not established below" (see Respondent's Primary Brief
at p. 49).
In light of the Tribe's erroneous assertions, some historical elaboration on Perank's Indian status is appropriate.

Both

the record and case law would seem to establish Perank's status
as an Indian.

Even though Perank was not fcn enrolled tribal

member at the time of the offense, he was entitled to be enrolled
under the Ute Tribal Constitution (and, as will be shown below,
has since been enrolled).
As a factual matter, Mr. Perank submitted affidavits at his
probation revocation hearing from his father and mother (R. 6972) which stated that Perank's father is a full-blooded Ute
Indian and an enrolled member of the Ute T)ribe, and that Perank
was born in Roosevelt while his family was residing on the
reservation.

The record also contains a copy of Perank's birth
3

certificate (R. 76), and those of other Perank family members
(R. 73-75).
Article II of the Ute Tribal Constitution—which was in
effect at the time of the offense—provided that the membership
of the Ute Indian Tribe included:
All children born to any member of the Ute Indian Tribe
of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation who is a resident
of the Reservation at the time of the [birth of said
children.1
Perank fits the mold.

The affidavits and birth certificates in

the record (R. 69-76) demonstrate that Perank was the son of an
enrolled member of the Ute Tribe (his father) who was residing on
the reservation at the time of Perankfs bitfth.

Under the Tribe's

Constitution Perank was deemed to be a tribal member from birth,
but was not formally enrolled because of a misinterpretation of
the Tribal Constitution by the Tribal Business Committee.
Despite the above-quoted provision of the Ute Tribal Constitution, the Tribal Business Committee attempted to limit tribal
enrollment to those persons possessing a quantum of at least
5/8ths Ute blood.

These policies were begmn in the mid-1950!s

1

A copy of Article II of the Tribal Constitution is attached hereto as Appendix A. The Court cam take judicial notice
of that document under Rule 201(b), Utah R^iles of Evidence. It
should be noted that after Perank was enrolled, this part of the
Constitution was amended to include a 5/8t^is blood quantum
requirement.
4

after the so-called "Mixed-Bloods" were terminated as tribal
members by an Act of Congress (25 U.S.C. Sections 677-677aa).
In 1977, lawsuits were filed in Ute Tribal Court on behalf
of various children of enrolled tribal members who had been
denied enrollment by the Tribal Business Cqmmittee because they
did not possess the 5/8ths quantum of Ute blood.

The plaintiffs

claimed they were entitled to tribal membership under the abovequoted section of Article II of the Tribal Constitution regardless of blood quantum.

In Chapoose, et aln/ v. Ute Indian Tribe,

et al. , Tribal Court No. 133-77f the Tribal Court held that
Article II of the Tribal Constitution did indeed control and
define membership in the Tribe, and the Tribal Business Committee
could not abrogate those provisions by a mpre restrictive ordinance.

The Tribal Court further found the plaintiffs were

entitled to tribal benefits retroactive to the date of their
complaints (1977).

That decision was appealed to the Tribal

Appellate Court, which affirmed.

Copies of those decisions are

attached as Appendices B and C, respectively, for the Court's
convenience.
In response to the above-cited rulingfe of the Tribal Courts,
the Business Committee enacted an ordinance allowing plaintiffs
to be enrolled as tribal members, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior, acting through the B.I.A. Reservation
5

Superintendent (see Chapoose v. Clark, infx\a).

The Reservation

Superintendent refused to approve the enrollment, relying on a
1955 Opinion by the Solicitor of the Interior stating that in the
1954 Termination Act (25 U.S.C. Sections 677-677aa) Congress had
preempted the Tribe's authority to set membership requirements.
Plaintiffs then sued the Secretary of the Interior in the
United States District Court.

In that action, Judge David K.

Winder held for the plaintiffs and found th}e Secretary's denial
of the enrollment "clearly wrong" on the grounds that despite the
1954 Act, the Ute Indian Tribe retained full power to control its
own membership and membership was to be defined by Article II of
the Ute Tribal Constitution, Chapoose, et gtl., v. Clark, 607
F.Supp. 1027, 1036-1037 (D.C. Utah, 1985).?
Finally, in the fall of 1986, the Tribal Business Committee
authorized enrollment of all persons in the same class as the
plaintiffs, i.e.:

"all children born to ahy member of the Ute

Indian Tribe . . . who is a resident of th£ reservation at the
time of the birth of said children."

Perafck was in the group of

persons so enrolled.
The Ute Tribefs brief claims that in order to qualify as an
2

It seems clear that the Tribe and its courts have full
authority to determine tribal membership (Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978)). However, the same does not hold
true for the determination of reservation boundaries (see discussion in Respondent's Primary Brief at pp. $-8).
6

Indian a person must be recognized as such by the Indian community in which he or she lives. Assuming,j arguendo, that is
true, in this case the Tribe's own Constitution has recognized
Perank as a member of the Tribe since his birth and Ute Tribal
Courts have so held.

It was only the Tribatl Business Committee

who refused to list Perank and others as tribal members until
required to do so by its own Courts.
Finally, the Tribe is not accurate wh^n it attempts to
create the impression that Perank was allowed to enroll only
during a "window of opportunity" in October of 1986.

If, as the

record seems to indicate, Mr. Perank was the son of an enrolled
tribal member who was residing on the reservation at the time of
the child's birth, the Tribal Constitution and decisions of the
Tribal Courts state that enrollment was his birthright from his
birth up to April 15, 1988, when the Tribe amended its Constitution to include the 5/8ths blood quantum requirement.3
Based on the affidavits and birth certificates in the record
and the subsequent enrollment of Mr. Perank as required by the
Tribal Constitution, we can reach no other conclusion than we
stated in our primary brief that "[g]iven the state of the record

3

This is further supported by the Tjribal Court's ruling
that the plaintiffs in Chapoose, et al., v|, Ute Indian Tribe, et
al., supra, were entitled to tribal royalties and other benefits
retroactive to the filing of their Complaints in 1977.
7

it cannot be said that Perank's status as am Indian under 18
U.S.C. Sections 1152 and 1153 was not establlished below" (Brief
of Respondent at 49).
CONCLUSION
The Tribe has had an opportunity to cojmment on the crucial
issue in this case but has chosen not to do so.

While the Court

should review the record and the law relating to Mr. Perank's
Indian status, Respondent State of Utah cannot in good faith
claim this is a controverted issue on appeal.

The real issue is

whether the crime was committed in "Indian Country".
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of August, 1988.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Utah Attorney General

"tesi^ZL

EARL P . 'DOlflOS
Assistant Attorney General

MICHAEL M
Assistant
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT
236 State Capitol Building
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICip
I hereby certify that four copies of the foregoing REPLY
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STATE OF UTAH were served by mailing the
same, first class postage prepaid, this 26th day of August,
1988, to:
Kirk C. Bennett
CONDER Sc WANGSGARD
Attorney for Appellant
4059 South 4000 West
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84120
Stephen G. Boyden
Attorney for Amicus Curiae
Ute Indian Tribe
1100 South 1500 East
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84105

Tom D. Tot^in
422 Main Street
WINNER SD 575 80
Alvin G. Nash
Herbert W. Gillespie
Duchesne county Courthouse
Center & l[00 South Street
DUCHESNE UT 84021
Attorneys for Amici Curiae
Ducheshe & Uintah Counties

MICHAEL M. JQDEAL^T/
A s s i s t a n t AtborT^y
G^tferjal

I. CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE LTE INDIAN TRIBE
OF THE UINTAH AND OURAY REsiRVATION
PREAMBLE
We, the Ute Indians of the Uintah, Uncompahgre and Whiteriver Bands hereafter to be known as
the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, in order to establish a more responsible
tribal organization, promote the general welfare, encourage educational progress, conserve and
develop our lands and resources, and secure to ourselves and <pur posterity the power to exercise
certain rights of home rule, not inconsistent with the Federal , Mate and local laws, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintih and Ouray Reservation.
Article I — Territory
The Jurisdiction of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Unitah and 0|iray Reservation shall extend to the
territory within the original confines of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation as set forth by Executive
Orders of October3, 1861 and January 5. 1882, and by the Acts o|f Congress approved May 27, 1902,
and June 19, 1902, and to such other lands without such boundaries as may hereafter be added thereto
under any law of the United States, except as otherwise provided by law.
Article II — Membershipl
Section 1. The membership of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation shall
consist as follows:
(a) All persons of Indian blood whose names appear on the offial census roll of the Ute Indian
Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation as of July 1, 1935.
(b) All children born to any member of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation
who is a resident of the Reservation at the time of the birth of said children.
Sec. 2. The Tribal Business Committee shall have the power to promulgate ordinances, subject to
review by the Secretary of the Interior, covering future membership and the adoption of new
members.
(a) No property rights shall be acquired or lost through membership in this organization except as
provided hereing.
Article III — The Business Committee
Section 1. Tne governing body of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation shall
be a business committee, known as the Uintah and Ouray Tribal Business Committee.
Sec. 2. The Tribal Business Committee shall consist of six members, two (2) members duly
elected from each of the three (3) bands of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation,
known as the Uintah, Uncompahgre and Whiteriver Bands.
Sec. 3. The members of the Tribal Business Committe shall Ibe elected for a term of four (4) years,
except ar the first election, when one (1) member from each banB shall be elected for a term of two (2)
years; thereafter, their successors shall be elected for a term of four (4) years.
Sec. 4. Tne Tribal Business Committee, so organized, shall elect from within its own number (1) a
chairman, (2) a vice-chairman; and from within or without, (3) a secretar)', and (4) a treasurer, and
such other officials and committees as may be deemed necesjsary.
Sec. 5. The first election of the Tribal Business Committee hereunder shall be called, held and
supervised by the present Tribal Business Committee within sixty (60) days after the ratification and
approval of this Constitution.
The candidate from each band receiving the highest number of votes shall hold office for a term of
four (4) years, and the candidate from each band receiving the next highest number of votes shall hold
office for two (2) years; thereafter, even' two (2) years a Tribal Business Committeeman shall be
elected from each band to represent such bands for a term of four (4) years.
After the first election, elections for the Tribal Business CJommittee shall be called at least sixty
(60) days prior to the expiration of the terms of office of ithe members of the Tribal Business
Committee.
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APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B
IN THE UTE TRIBAL COURT
UINTAH AND OURAY RESERVATION
STATE OF UTAH

HASKELL LEVI CHAPOOSE, as Guardian
Ad Litem for and on behalf of his minor
children, to-wit: Shaun Thomas
Chapoose, JaNae Lyn Chapoose, Dixon
Levi Chapoose, Michell Quetta Chapoose,
and Connor Charles Chapoose,

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
Plaintiffs,

X

1
vs.

X

JUDGEMENT

X
UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH AND
OURAY RESERVATION, UINTAH AND OURAY
TRIBAL BUSINESS COMMITTEE, RUBY BLACK,
CHARLES REDFOOT, ANTONE APPAWOO, MYRON
ACCUTTOROOP, OURAY McCOOK, FLOYD
WOPSOCK, as members of the Uintah and
Ouray Tribal Business Committee, and
CECIL ANDRUS, Secretary of the Interior
of the United Statesof America,

X
XCivil No. 133-77
X
X
X
X
X
X
$

X
Defendants.

X

This matter comes on for hear|ing upon the Defendants1
Motion for Summary Judgement.

The Courit, having been advised of

the facts, which are undisputed in this matter, will dispose
of all issues in this judgement.
The Ute Tribal Court of the Uintah and Ouray Reservatic
is the proper forum to hear cases affecting membership in rhe
Tribe.

See, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Julia

Martinez,

et al.*

76-682 published in 46 L.W. 4412 (1978J , and also
v. Ute Indian Tribe,

et al.,

Sup. Ct.

Pritchett,

et al.

Civil Action NO. 52-77.

The Court in Civil No. 92-77 has disposed of the
question as to "What are the qualifications of a person to become
a member of the Ute Indian Tribe of thfe Uintah and Ouray
Reservation?"
APPENDIX B

The facts in this case are as follows:
That the plaintiff, Haskell Levi Chapoosef is the father
of the following children:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Shaun Thomas Chapoose, born on April 23, 1967;
JaNae Lyn Chapoose, born on March 15, 1969;
Dixon Levi Chapoose, born on| February 24, 1971;
Michelle Quetta Chapoose, botn on April 30, 1973;

5.

Connor Charles Chapoose, born on November 13, 197 6.

That Haskell Levi Chapoose was blorn on August 30, 194 0
at Fort Duchesne, Utah and he was listed ais member No. 199 in the
list of full-blood in the Federal Registeri on April 5, 1956; he
having been born to Connor Chapoose and Li^lu Wass, both of whom
were full-bloods; that he married Sherrie IL. Dixon on Sept. 3, 1966,
and since that time they have been and now are husband and wife;
that he and his wife resided upon the Uintah and Ouray Reservation
at the time each of his children above named were born.
That thereafter, the plaintiff, Haskell Levi Chapoose,
made application to the Tribal Business Committee of the Uintah
and Ouray Reservation requesting that each of said children be
admitted to membership, and said applications were denied on
June 2, 1977.
The Constitution and By-laws of the Ute Indian Tribe
provide:
"Article II —

MEMBERSHIP:

Section 1. The membership of the Ute Indian Tribe
of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation shall consist
as follows:
(a) All persons of Indian blood whose names appear
on the official census roll of the Ute Indian Tribe
of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation as of July 1,
1935.
(b) All children born to any member of the Ute Indian
Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation who is a
resident of the Reservation at |the time of the birth
of said children.
Section 2. The Tribal Business Committee shall have
the power to promulgate ordinances, subject to review
by the Secretary of the Interior, covering future
membership and the adoption of new members.
(a) No property rights shall be acquired or lost
through membership in this org4nization except as
provided herein."

The Constitution and By-laws also provide in Article
VI —

POWERS OF THE TRIBAL BUSINESS COMMITTEE, as follows:
"Section 1. Enumerated Powers. — The Tribal Business
Committee of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation shall
exercise the following powers, subjecbt to any limitations imposed by the statutes or the Constitution
of the United States, and subject fujrther to all express restrictions upon such powers contained in this
Constitution and By-laws, and subject: to review by the
Ute Bands themselves at any annual or special meeting:
(j) To enact resolutions or ordinances, not inconsistent with Article II of this Constitution governing
adoption and abandonment of members, and to keep at
all times a correct roll of the members of the Ute
Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation."
And Article X — AMENDMENTS, st|ates as follows:
"Amendments to the Constitution and JBy-laws may be
ratified and approved in the same manner as this Constitution and By-laws. Whenever the Tribal Business
Committee shall, by an affirmative vote of four or
more members, call for the submission of an amendment,
the Secretary of the Interior shall call an election
upon the proposed amendment. If at such election the
amendment is adopted by a majority df the qualified
voters of the Tribe voting thereon and if at least
thirty (3 0) per cent of those entitled to vote shall
vote in such election, such amendment shall be submitted to the Secretary of the Interior and if approved
by him, shall thereupon take effect!"
Pursuant to Article II, Section 2, in 1958 the Tribal

Business Committee passed Ordinance No. p-58-1 dated September 17
1958, as follows:
."WHEREAS, much confusion has resulted on enrollment applications received on behalf of children born to parents,
one of which is Ute Indian and the other either nonIndian or an Indian of another Tribe; and,
WHEREAS, the applications are becoming more frequent
and the spirit of Public Law 671 (68 Stat. 8 68) is not
being carried out by enrollment of phildren of 1/2
degree Ute Indian blood; and
WHEREAS, it is the desire of Ute Iridians to further restrict
enrollment with the Ute Indian Tribje to prevent
reoccurence of a condirion of many Jmixed-bloods on the rolls
as was the case before the enactment of Public Law 671;
and,
WHEREAS, it is deemed to the best in terest of the Ute
Indian Tribe to so restrict further enrollment; and,
WdEKEPS, under Article II, Section 2.of the Constitution
of the Ute Indian Tribe, the Tribal Business

Committee is empowered to promuxyaue UIUJ.U
ances subject to review by the Secretary of
the Interior covering future membership and
the adoption of new members,

I
|
I

NOW THEREFORE BE IT ENACTED BY THE UINTAH AND
OURAY TRIBAL BUSINESS COMMITTEE that hereafter
no person born subsequent to the adoption of
this Ordinance shall be enrolled in the Ute
Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation unless the degree of Ute Indian blood
of such person is five-eighth (5/8) or more.
Ute Indian blood as construed in this ordinance shall mean Ute Indian blood of the Ute
Indian Tribe of the Uintah and OUray Reservation, Utah."
And the Tribal Business Committee on July 26, 1950
passed the following Ordinance which read^ in part:

I

"Defining 'Indian blood1 for thq purposes of
future membership. Be it enacted subject to
review of the Secretary of the Interior that
hereafter for purposes of determining membership in the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah
and Ouray Reservation all Indian blood possessed by persons whose names appear on the
census roll of July 1, 1935 shall be deemed
to be Ute Indian blood."

I

Counsel for the plaintiff bring$ this action pursuant to

i

I the provisions of Public Law 90-284 passed April 11, 1968 commonly
I knows as the ICRA.
THE COURT FINDS that Section 1(b) of Article II of the
| Constitution and By-laws of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and
I Ouray Reservation applies in this case sihce one parent was a mem»•

jl ber of the Tribe at the time of the birth of said children they
i

IJ

j, are therefore entitled to be enrolled to membership in the Ute
jl
I Indian Tribe.
I
ii
The Court notes that Section 1(b) of Article II provides
!|

j. for birth of children to any member (in the singular) , and if said
ji

jj parent resides on the reservation at rhe time of the birth of the
i

I*

>

I child, only one parent need be a member 6f the Tribe. No amendjjments have been made to the Constitution and By-laws as provided
jby Article X.

The Constitution is the primary law of the reservation
and in any situation where the same conflicts with an ordinance,
the ordinance shall yield and the Constitution shall take precedence.

This does not mean that said Ordinance No. 0-58-1, at the

idate of the commencement of this action, was null and void in all
situations, but only as to those parts which conflict with the
^Constitution itself.

If the Tribal Business Committee desires to

amend, there is provision for the amendment to be followed by the
Business Committee in Article X above mentioned.
Counsel for the defendants has urged consideration of
Amended Enrollment Ordinance No. 78-8 of March 13, 1978 and Ordinance No. 78-9 (which made some minor amendments to^Ordinance No.
78-9) as superseding Ordinance No. 0-58-1 of September 17, 1958.
This can not nullify the cause of action which accrued on June 2,
1977.
There are many points of law raised by counsel concernin
the issues in this case which this Court feels are not persuasive
and are irrelevant.

Therefore the Court! will not respond thereto.

I
THE COURT THEREFORE FINDS that the following children of
Haskell Levi Chapoose should be enrolled as members in good standing of the Ute Indian Tribe as of June 2, 1977:
SHAUN THOMAS CHAPOOSE, born ori April 23, 1967;
JANAE LYN CHAPOOSE, born on Mcjrch 15, 19 69;
DIXON LEVI CHAPOOSE, born on February 24, 1971;
MICHELLE QUETTA CHAPOOSE, born on April 30, 1973;
CONNOR CHARLES CHAPOOSE, born on November 13, 197 6.
IT IS .THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Tribal Business Committee is hereby enjoined to deny membership ir
the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Quray Reservation to the
above named children of Haskell Levi Chkpoose, and

-5-

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants forthwith
cause the plaintiff's childrens names to b^ added to the census
rolls of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Umtald and Ouray Reservation
and cause the Finance Officer of the Ute Indian Tribe to pay to
Haskell Levi Chapoose, as the natural guardian of said children,
all dividends or other benefits related to| Tribal Membership
together with interest at the rate of six |per cent per annum from
the date said payments should have been maide to this date covering
all payments due after June 2, 1977.
Court costs are assessed against the Tribal Business
Committee.
DATED this .^^

day of October, 197 9,

BY THE COURT:

<rr~<TRI$AL JUDGE

CERTIFICATION
f CERJTfFY THAT THIS DOCUMENT fS A
TFU/E /^ND CORR^O? C O ^ T ^ F THE ORIGINAL
~"

COURT CLERK

j/

^

APPENDIX
111 THE UTE TRIBAL APPELLATE COURT

CIV
CIV
CIV
CIV
CIV

HASKELL LEVI CHAPOOSE, .et al
DORTHEA UNCA SAM GARCIA, et-al
MARIETTA CHAPOOSE REED, et al
E. MAX IE CHAPOOSE, et al
JOHN WOPSOCK, et al
Plaintiff-Appellees

No. 133-77
No. 9-78
No. 11-78
No. 10-78
No. 12-78

v.
UI UTAH AND OURAY TRIBAL BUSINESS COMMITTEE
Defendants-Appellants
ON APPEAL FROM THE UTE TRIBAL COURT
Argued March 6, 1980 and October 15, 19S0
Decided January 22, 1981
APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL:
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OPINION OF THE COURT
Wyasket, J.

These cases involve attempts by enrolled members of the Tribe to

secure the enrollment.of their children.

Each of the Plaintiffs below had

applied to the Tribal Business Committee on behalf lof their minor children for
the enrollment of those children.

The Tribal Business Committee denied each

of the applications on the grounds that the children did not meet the 5/8 Ute
blood quantum requirement in the enrollment ordinance in force at the time of
the application.

APPENDIX C

Follov/ing the denial of the enrollment applications, Plaintiffs filed
individual actions in the lite Tribal Court in the nature of Mandamus requesting
an order requiring the enrollment of their children.

Named as defendants in those

actions were the Ute Tribe of the Uintah and OuraylReservation, the Uintah and
Ouray Tribal Business Committee in their personal and official capacities, and
the Secretary of the Interior as a representative of the United States.

In a

letter to the Tribal Court dated June 2, 1978, theiUnited States Department of
Justice protested the naming of the Secretary of the Interior as a party defendant
The Tribal defendants moved the trial court to dismiss.
The Tribal Court, the Honorable George Armstrong presiding, granted the
motion to dismiss defendants Ute Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, and
the members of the Tribal Business Committee in their individual capacities on
October 4, 1978.

The motion to dismiss v/as denied as to the Uintah and Ouray

Tribal Business Committee
capacities.

and the individual members thereof in their official

No formal motion having been filed urging dismissal of the Secretary

of the Interior, the Secretary was not dismissed, fend the Secretary has not
appealed.

While this Court recognized the principle of international law that one
Nation does not generally have jurisdiction in its| courts over another Nation
without its consent, this Court is not accustomed to trying cases by letter.
Simple, straightforward, and commonly recognized procedures are available to
any party defendant who believes they have been improperly brought before the
Courts of the Ute Tribe. The Ute Tribe has always! complied with the procedural
rules of the courts of the United States and the sjeveral States in raising
such issues, and this Court knows of no reason that extending such a courtesy
to the Ute Tribe would cause an undue hardship to a great nation like the
United States.

the reservation at the time of the birth of their children, and the cases were
submitted on defendant's motions for summary judgment on the stipulated facts.
The Tribal Court, on October 30, 1979, granted judgment to Plaintiffs in Civil
Numbers 133-77 (Haskell Levi CHAP00SE), 9-78 (GARCIA), and 11-78 (REED0, and
dismissed the actions in Civil Numbers 10-78 (E. Maxie CHAP00SE), and 12-78
(W0PS0CK) on the grounds that the statute of limitations had run as to those
claims.

The Tribal Business Committee brought t h H timely appeal from the

judgment in Civil Numbers 133-77, 9-78, and 11-78.

On December 13, 1979,

Plaintiffs in Civil Numbers 10-78 and 12-78 filed notices of appeal, and
Respondents in Civil Numbers 133-77, 9-78 and 11-78 filed cross appeals. The
Tribal Business Committee has moved to dismiss the appeals and cross appeals by
all Plaintiffs below.

At oral argument on March 6, 1980, Civil Numbers 133-77,

9-78 and 11-78 were joined for appeal, and the Court hereby consolidates and
joins Civil "Numbers 10-78 and 12-78 with these cases for decision herein^ For
the sake of clarity, the parties will be referred to by their designations in
the Tribal Court.

I.
The inixial determination to be made by this Court is whether the appeals
in Civil Numbers 10-78 and 12-78, and the cross appeals in Civil Numbers 133-77,
9-78 and 11-78 can stand in the face of the defendant's motions to dismiss.
Defendant aroues that the twenty day time limit prescribed in Rule 37(c) of the
Ute Indian Rules of Civil Procedure for the filing of the notice of appeal is
jurisdictional and dispositive of the appeals and cross appeals'filed by Plainti
In pertinent part, Rule 37(c) U.I.R.C.P. states:
C) Time; Notice of Appeal. Within 20 days from the entry of
tne order of (sic) judgment appealed from the party taking the
appeal must file with the trial court a written notice of appeal
specifying the parties to the appeal, the order or judgment appealed
from. ar*G a short statement of the reason or grounds for the appeal
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including subsection (c) none of which are jurisdictional by t h e i r terms.
Compliance with some subsections is clearly within the exclusive province
of appellants while other provisions depend upon th$ diligence of court
personnel and respondents for compliance.

Because holding compliance in toto

with Rule 37 j u r i s d i c t i o n a l would submit an aggrieved parties 1 appeal to
possible failure due to causes outside his control, v/e are loath to do so.
However, the orderly administration of justice requires that a t some
point final orders and judgments of the Tribal Court must no longer be subject
to appeal.

In other words, t h e r e must be a definative occurrence upon which a

judgment not void ab i n i t i o must be considered res judicata as against any attack
In the absence of a definite occurrence easily ascertainable by any person, the
p a r t i e s , public, and governmental o f f i c i a l s could never be sure when-a final order
or judgment of the Tribal Court could be relied upon.
I t is also c l e a r from the language of the statute that the l e g i s l a t i v e
intent is to limit appeals to cases wherein a noticfe of appeal is filed within
the prescribed time l i m i t .

We, therefore, hold that the time limitation of 20

days for filing an original notice of intent to appeal found in U.I.R.C.P. Rule
37(c) is jurisdictional and accordingly, the appeals in Civil Numbers 10-78 and
12-73 must be and are hereby dismissed.
However, once the order o r judgment has come udder attack by appeal, simple
fairness indicates t h a t the respondent be given an opportunity to r a i s e those
portions of that order or judgment by which he deemls himself aggrieved.

This

Court recognizes t h a t in many cases a party may be laggrieved by a portion of an
order or judgment of the Tribal Court but may not wish to undertake the costly
and time consuming process of an appeal. "Once a judgment has been brought under
attack and the respondent brought before t h i s Court, the Court in the absence
of a clear l e g i s l a t i v e expression to the contrary views a cross appeal as being
in the nature of.a counterclaim.
A

Rule 37(b) U.I.R.C.P. clearly indicates m a t a nc^unuu-w
aggrieved by a portion of any final order, commitment, or judgment of the
trial court has a right to appeal.

However, Rule 37 does not clearly indicate

the procedures to be followed on such a cross appeal i. In the absence of
legislative direction by the Tribal Business Committee as to the proper procedures for cross appeals, we today announce the following rules for taking
cross appeals by respondents.

Within twenty days off the filing of appellants

notice of appeal, which time period shall be jurisdictional, respondent may
file a notice of cross appeal with the trial court in the same manner as notices
of appeal are filed.

Respondent shall brief all issued raised in his cross

appeal in his reply brief.

Appellant shall then have 20 days after receipt of

respondent's brief, memorandum or statement in which to reply, to the new issues
raised by the cross appeal.
in Rule 37 U.I.R.C.P.

Cross appeals shall otherwise proceed as provided

In the interest of justice the time limitation on filing

cross, appeals announced herein shall have prospective application only, and
Plaintiffs cross appeals in Civil Numbers 133-77, 9-78 and 11-78 will be
considered by this Court.

Defendants motion to di$miss these cross appeals is

accordingly denied.

II.
Defendants first assignment of error is that the Tribal Business Committee
and its members while acting in their official capacity are immune from suit
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity and that the court below erred in
failing to dismiss.

In support of this proposition, Defendants cite, inter alia,

U.L.O.C. I 1-2-7, § 1-8-5 and the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S: 49 (1978ft. Plaintiffs reply that mandar
is always an appropriate remedy for illegal actions of governmental officials evi
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25 U.S.C. 1301 et. seq.f constitutes an implied waiver of sovereign .immunity
in the tribal courts, and also cite the Santa Clara Pueblo decision in support
• ,
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of their position.
The question of jurisdiction whether raised in a state or federal court or
this Court is frequently a delicate matter to deal with, and is especially so
when the material and most important objection to the jurisdiction of this Court
involves the basic nature of tribal government and the interrelationship of its
parts to one another.

It is, however, a question which we are called upon, and

which it is our duty to decide^

In the words of the famous jurist Justice John

Marshall in Cohen v. Virginia 6 Wheat. 264, 404, 5 .LEd. 257, 291:
It is most true that this court will not take jurisdiction if it should
not; but it is equally true that it must take jurisdiction if it should.
The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because.it
approaches the confines of the Constitution.
because it is doubtful.

W£ cannot pass it by

With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties,

a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us.
We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is
given, than to usurp that which is not given.
be treason to the Constitution.

The one or the other would

Questions may occur which we would gladly

avoid, but we cannot avoid them. .All we can do is to exercise our best
judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty.

The decision in Santa Clara Pueblo, supra, stinds for the proposition
that an Indian'tribe, as a tribe, is immune from suit in the federal courts
absent an explicit and unequivocal waiver of that irtmunity by Congress, and
that no such waiver is to be implied. See, Santa Clara Pueblo, supra at 58-59.
We agree. Furthermore, the Court held that, as an individual officer of the
Pueblo, Governor Lucario Padilla was not protected by the tribe's'immunity
from suit. Santa Clara Pueblo, supra at 59. The issue in Santa Clara Pueblo then
became whether the Indian Civil Rights Act created an implied cause of action
against an individual in the federal courts, and the" court held that it did not.
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that the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation is inherently
entitled to sovereign immunity.

Accord, Santa Clara Pueblo, supra.

However,

the issue to be decided herein is not whether the Tribe is immune from suit,
but whether the Tribal Business Committee and its members in their official
capacities are immune from suit in a mandamus action to enforce an alleged
constitutional right.
The Constitution of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation
is the organic and fundamental law of this Tribe which lays the basic principles
to which its internal life is to be conformed, organizing the government, conferring authority upon certain branches of that government limiting the exercise of
Governmental powers, and guaranteeing certain individual rights.

Within that

Constitution, the enumerated powers of the Tribal Business Committee encompass,
inter alia, the legislative, executive, administrative, ministerial, and economic
"functions of the tribe.
Pursuant to Article VI, Section 1 (K) of the Constitution, this Court has
been conferred general jurisdiction over all civil causes of action by U.L.O.C.
Section 1-2-5 which provides in pertinent part:
Subject to any contrary provisions, exceptions, or limitations contained
in either federal law, or the Tribal Constitution, the Courts of the Ute
Tribe shall have jurisdiction over all civil causes of action . . .
In addition to this grant of general jurisdiction, the authority of the Ute Courl
to issue extraordinary writs is recognized by statute. A Writ of Mandamus is su'
an extraordinary writ, and its issuance is authorized by U.I.R.C.P. Rule 35 (a)
which states:
a)

Grounds for Relief.

Where no other plain, speedy, and adequate

remedy exists, relief may be obtained by obtaining an extraordinary
writ which may be granted for any one of thfe 'following grounds:

1) • . . .
2) . . . .
3) Where t h e r e l i e f sought is to compel any inferior
7

tribunal,

Doara ur yti ^uu ^

r^.

. _.

enjoins as a duty resulting from an office^ trust, or station;
or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment
of a right or office to which he 1s entitled and from which he
is unlawfully excluded by such inferior tribunal, board, or
person; or
4) . . . .
While U.L.O.C- 5 1-2-7

provides that whatever immunity the tribe, its officers,

or employees may have is not waived by the general grant of jurisdiction contained
therein, its application here begs the question.
what extent the defendants are
of the Tribe of tne common law.

The question is whether, and to

immune from suit und^r the Constitution and Code
Turning first to the Tribal code, v/e find that

the only provision of the Ute Constitution or Law and Order Code specifically
establishes the defense of sovereign .immunity which has been brought to the
attention of this Court is found at U.L.O.C. § 1-8-5.

This section states that,

"The Ute Tribe shall be immune from suit in any civfil action1', and tribal officers
shall be immune from l:any liability arising from thp performance of their official
duties."

Apparently, there are as many definitions of "liability" as there are

cases wherein courts have seen fit to define the term.

See, Blacks Law Dictionary

at 1059 (Revised Fourth Edition 1968) (West Publishing Co.) and cases cited
therein.

However, the distinction drawn between the immunity from "any civil

action" and "any liability" in this statute persuades this Court that the immunity
granted to tribal officers and employees is not intended to be immunity from any
civil action, but is intended to provide immunity from personal liability in the
sense of payment of damages or property from personal assets for alleged injuries
arising from the performance of the official duties of those officers and employe*
This Court can find no authority, and counsel1 have directed it to none,
which specifically grants the Tribal Business Committee an

exception in the form

of a sovereign immunity defense, such as granted the tribe in U.L.O.C. § 1-2-5.

8

ne general rule ^s that a». express excepnuu

LU
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WU..V..
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authority precludes the establishment of other and different exceptions by
implication.

See» Massachusetts Trustees of East., G. and F. Assoc, v. United

States, 312 F. 2d.-214, 222 {1st Cir. 1963):

"We believe that;limitations

upon an otherwise general grant of power should ncj>t lightly be inferred."

In

the words of the United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States
v, Jones, 567 F. 2d. 965, 967 (10th Cir. 1977):
As a genera^ principle of statutory construction, if a statute
specifies o n e exception to the general application, other exceptions
are exclude^1

expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Vie are, however, reluctant to adopt so wide a rule, and, for public policy
reasons, in this
sufficient

case

to stflte

decline to do so. From thei foregoing discussion, it is

that

the Constitution and statutes of the Ute Tribe

nowher?

specifically provide immunity for these defendants in the instant case.

We ar£>

therefore, c o m p e l ^ to consider whether the common law doctrine of sovereign
immunity applies

5 0 a s t o b a r thl s

' action.

Defendants <pte Duoan'v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620, 10 L.Ed. 2d. 15, 23 (190:
for the propositi00 that:
The aeneral

ru e

^

1S

that "a suit is against the sovereign if "the

judcment s o U 9 ^ would expend itself on the public treasury or domain,
or interfere w"*th

the

public administration,," or if the effect of the

judament w o u ^ be "to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel
it to act".

(citations omitted).

While this p r o p e l ^ o n

1S

attractive at face vallue,*the United States Supreme

Court in Duoan a l s o recognized two distinct exceptions to that rule:-"(l) actic
by officers beyond their statutory (constitutional) powers, and (2) even thougi
within the scope °f their authority, the powers themselves or the manner in wh
they are exercise^

are

constitutionally void.ff

Bowdoin, 359 U.S. 6 ^ 3 , 547 (1962).

Duoan, supra, at 621; Mai one v

In attempting to analytically rationalize

(1 Cranch) 137; Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682
(1949); and Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 426 U.S. 49 (1978) with this rule
and its exceptions, it becomes readily

apparent thatone is caught in an

analytical treadmill.
In Harbury v. Madison, supra, William Marbury had been appointed as a
Justice of the Peace for the District of Columbia during the waning portion of
John Adams1 term as President of the United States.

Pursuant to the statute

then in effect, the signed commission was forwarded from the President to the
Secretary of State!s office to be sealed and recorded.

Mr. Lincoln, then

Secretary of State, and James Madison who succeeded him, refused to deliver
the cornmission or a copy thereof to Marbury, and Marbury brought an action
asking the Court to order the Secretary of State to deliver the commission or
a copy thereof to him as evidence of his appointment as a Justice of the Peace.
In its embryonic form, the issue of sovereign immunity of an agent of the United
States v/as raised by Mr. Lincoln when he objected that he was not bound by the
Court, and ought not to answer as to any facts which came officially to his
knowledge as Secretary of State.

Marbury, supra at 143.

Furthermore, the

Secretary of" State objected that the court had no authority to compel him to
deliver the commission.
The Court in Marbury first considered whether the Plaintiff had a"legal
right to the cornmission, and determined that withholding the commission was not
warranted by law, and violated a vested legal right of the Plaintiff.

Marbury,

supra at 152. The Court then reached the issue of whether he had a remedy for
the breach of his vested legal right by an officer of the United States. In
finding that it was not the office of the person sued but the nature of the act
which determined whether the action could be maintained, the Court stated at If
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departments are the political or confidential agdnts of the executive, merely to execute the will of the President!, or rather to act
in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal
discretion, nothing can be more.perfectly clear 1^han that their acts
are only .-politically examinable.

But where a specific duty is

assigned by law, and individual rights depend upcpn the performance
of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers
himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for
a remedy.
A cursory examination of Justice Marshall's ruling in light of the rule
announced in Dugan, supra, would seem to indicate that the action should have
been barred.

Clearly, a mandamus issued to an official of the government

compelling an action within his authority would be to "compel (the Government)
to act".
In Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp,, 337 U.S. 682 (1949),
plaintiff alleged a breach of a contract of sale by the Administrator of the
War Assets Administration, a legislatively created gqvemment agency.

Plaintiff

prayed for an injunction to prevent the Administrator! from delivering the coal,
which was the subject of the contract, to a third party, and for a declaration
thai the coal actually belonged to the plaintiff und^r the contract.
stance then, plaintiff's case was very

In sub-

similar to that of William Marbury in

that in both cases, plaintiff sought an extraordinary writ to cure an alleged
legal wrong.

In Larson, however, .the court refused to consider whether the

contract had, in fact, been violated and ruled that the Administrator was immune
from suit under the theory that the requested relief would "restrain the government" from acting by ordering the Administrator not to sell or deliver the coal
involved to anyone other than the plaintiff.

Larson^ supra, at 688, 689.

In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 1(1978), plaintiff brought
an action for injunctive relief against the Santa Cliara Pueblo and its Governor,
Lucario Padilla, seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a tribal ordinance which
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allegedly vioiaieu ptoiuui, *> . .^..^^

_

words, plaintiff claimed an alleged legal wrong, and sought injunctive relief
to restrain the government, in the form of the Governor, from continuing its
•alleged wrongdoing.

In Santa Clara Pueblo, supra, the Court summarily stated

that Governor Padilla was not immune from suit.
In all these cases there lies a common thread.

Plaintiff alleges a legal

wrong to him by a government official, plaintiff brings an action for extraordinary relief to cure the wrong, and in all these cases, the official, if the
requested relief is to be entered, must be ordered to do that which he was
refusing to do, or to not do that which he was doing.

If the rule of Duoan v.

Rank, supra, is dispositive of such cases, it is clea^r that the defendant must
be held iinmune in each case.

However, in the Marburvj and Santa Clara Pueblo

decisions, the government official was held not to be immune.
The difficulty here lies in determining when and how the activities of a
person occupying an official position in the government acts in such a manner
that his actions are not personal actions, but are, *in fact, the actions of the
sovereign.

For the sovereign can act only through its agents, Larson, supra, at

635, and when an agent acts for the sovereign, the spit is barred, not because
it is against an officer of the government, but because it complains of an act
of the sovereign. JcL
In this situation, the exceptions posed in Dugafi become effectively a
restatement of the rule.

In other words, the only way to determine whether the

rule applies, is to first determine that the exceptilons do not apply.

A better

method of analyzing the instant case would be, then, to first determine whether
the action by the defendants is within their statutorily or constitutionally
delegated authority, and, second, if the power to aot has been constitutionally
delegated to that officer, whether the power was exercised in a constitutional
manner.

If so, the act of the officer, the sovereign's agent, is an act of
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those actions.
Applying this test to the situations found *in Hftrbury, Larson,- and Santa_
Clara, it is clear that the results of each case may| be rationally explained.
In Marbury, the act complained of consisted of the Secretary of State denying
a copy of a commission on record

in his office to the Plaintiff.

The question

then becomes, did the Secretary have the statutory or constitutional authority
to deny' plaintiff a copy of the corrnrission?

Since the Congress had by statute

required the Secretary to deliver a copy of all such| papers on record in his
office to any member of the public upon payment of a required fee, the Court
determined that he. did not have the delegated authority to refuse a copy.

Thus,

since the sovereign had left him no discretion in the matter, his refusal became
a personal act against which relief could be granted.
In Larson, the Administrator was "empowered by the sovereign to administer
a-general sales program" and as a normal outgrowth d)f that power of agency, was
authorized to refuse delivery when he determined that no delivery was called for
under a contract of sale.

Larson, supra, at 692. Therefore, the Administrator's

refusal was well within the authority delegated to him by the sovereign.

Upon

invoking the second prong of our test, we find that there was no allegation that
the delegation of authority was not constitutionally made, or that the authority
was not constitutionally exercised. Td[ at 691.

Thus, the Administrator's acts

were the acts of the sovereign and the Administrator was absolutely iV-mune from
suit.

Alternatively, in Santa Clara, the Governor of the Pueblo exercised
3

We are compelled to note at this point, that the Administrator was not immur
only when his refusal to deliver was in fact a corrfect interpretation of the
government's rights under the contract. Alleging & cause of action, and alleging
an action without the sovereigns delegation of authority to the official are two
separate and distinct propositions. "If the actions of an officer do not conflict
with the terms of his valid statutory authority, then they are actions of the
sovereign whether or not (they would give rise to a private cause of action)."
Larson, supra, at 595. To hold otherwise would be to hold an officer immune only
when he makes correct decisions and such is not thfe case.
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a u t h o r i t y in enroumpm,

IIL,CU• i

as a member of the governing council of the Pueblo and therefore had no individual
authorization by the sovereign to act in such matteris.
The appropriate test, then, as to whether an agent of the government is
immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, consists of a twopronged inquiry.

In each case, the act complained of, whether ommission or

commission, must be considered to determine (1) whether the action is within the
statutorily or constitutionally delegated authority of that agent, and (2) if so,
whether the authority to act was exercised in an constitutional manner. This Court
for these purposes, finds it appropriate to adopt and a^ply the scope of authority
exception to the sovereign immunity rule.
Turning now to the facts before us, it is 'important*!© determine the
characteristics and status of the various defendants prior to consideration of
the complained of action.

The ultimate sovereign is clearly the people of the

lite Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation.

The constitution of the Tribe

states in the preamble:
We, the Ute Indians of the Uintah, Uncompahgfe and Whiteriver Bands
hereafter to be known as the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray
Reservation . . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray ReservationThe Uintah and Ouray Tribal Business Committee is the aoverning body of the Ute
Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation (created by Article III of that
Constitution, and is constitutionally vested with, among others, specific
legislative, executive, administrative, and'ministerial powers of the Tribe.
In other words, the Tribal Business Committee is the branch of the Tribal
government to which the ultimate sovereign,.the Ute people, has delegated
certain political, discretionary, and mandatory authority necessary for the day
to day functions of the tribal government.

14

Constitution Article VI.

The Tribal Business Cu».rnitiee

LUI^UW,

,

duly elected from each of the three (3) bands of the Ute Indian Tribe of the
Uintah and Ouray Reservation, known as the Uintah, UncomDahgre and Whiter?ver
Bands."

Constitution Article III, Section 2. The Business Committee elects

certain officers. . Constitution Article III, Section 4, and the By-Laws of the
Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah

and Ouray Reservation endow these officers with

certain duties and authorities which are not critical here.

By-Laws, Article I.

It is sufficient here to note that the members and officers, as individuals,
are nowhere granted any authority by the constitution to act in enrollment
matters.
The defendants then are analytically distinguishable agents of the ultimate
sovereign created by the constitution.

The critical question.is whether, in the

instant case, these agents are exercising the authority of the sovereign., and if
so, whether they are exercizing those powers in a method approved by that soverei
The Uintah and Ouray Tribal Business Committee is not a body which has been
delegated general authority by the sovereign.

Contrarywise, it is a body with

specific delegated authority which enumerates the subject matter within which
that body is authorized to act on behalf of the sovereign, and places specific
limitations upon that delegated authority.

The act of the Tribal .Business

CouHiittee herein complained of is the denial of plaintiff's enrollment applications, and the initial question then becomes whether, in these circumstances,
the Tribal Business Committee has the authority to deny those applications.
Since plaintiffs allege a vested constitutional right which the corrmittee allec
does not have the authority to deny, the decision as to the immunity of
defendants becomes, in effect, a decision on the merits.

the

See, Larson v. Domes'

and Foreicn Commerce Corp., supra, at 690.
Defendants primary contention is that Article II of the Ute Constitution
created

a closed class of persons who constituted the initial membership of t\
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Tribe, and that thereafter, the oetenuinoLiun ^. ...w..._
to be made by "the Tribal Business Committee.

,

Article II provides:

Article II - Membership
Section 1." The membership of the,Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and
Ouray Reservation shall consist as follows:
(a) All persons of Indian blood whose names appear on the
official (sic) census roll of the Ute Indian Tribe of the
Uintah and Ouray Reservation as of July 1, 1935.
(b) All children born to any member of the Ute Indian Tribe
of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation who is a resident of the
Reservation at the time of the birth of said children.
Section 2. The Tribal Business Corrmittee shall have the power to promulgate ordinances, subject to review by the Secretary of the Interior,
covering future membership and the adoption of new members.
.(a) No property rights shall .be acquired or lost through
membership in this organization except as provided herein (sic).
This contention is not persuasive.
Article II of the Constitution clearly indicates at least two classes of
persons who constitute the membership of.the Tribe.

While we agree that the

class defined in Article II, Section 1(a) constitutes a closed class of members •
as of the date of enactment of the Constitution, Section 1(b) of Article II does
not by its terms create a closed class.

Section 1 of Article II does not state

that it refers only to the initial membership, nor does it, on its face, place
any limitation as to which children born to a member of the Tribe residing on
the reservation are eligible for membership.

Neither does Section 2 specifically

place any such limitations on the persons recognized as eligible for membership
in Section 1. -The Tribal Constitution is replete with examples which show that
the framers thereof knew how to specifically limit certain provisions to initial
application only.

See for example, Article III, Section 3 (terms of members of

the Business Committee); Article III, Section 5 (election of members of the
Business Committee).

They did not do so with Article II, Section 1(b). Since

no limitation is specifically placed on the class..of persons defined .in Section
1(b), "the question is whether the Business Committee has been granted the

authority to place n m u a u u n b upuu m o u ^.^^^ „w „^ __
membership to a person who fits within the class.
Defendants forcefully argue that Section 2 of Article II constitutes a
general grant of legislative authority in membership matters of sufficient
scope and breadth to allow the Business Committee tlo pass ordinances which
effectively preclude the right to membership for sojme persons within the class
defined in Article II, Section 1(b). In support ofl this argument, they cite
a long history of Tribal Ordinances establishing certain blood quantum requirements as a prerequisite to enrollment.
We recognize the venerable principle that great deference is to be given
to legislative interpretations of Constitutional pd>wer and that when constitutiona
language is ambigious, its effect may be established by usage.

See, for example,

Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young, 309 U.S. 517 (1940); Ex Parte Qui ran, '317 U.S. 1,
41-42 (1942).

However, even legislative, judicial and administrative interpreta-

tions of long standing cannot deprive a person of k vested and absolute constitutional right.

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

of constitutional and statutory construction indicate that every

Basic principles
word and clause

of the constitution is intended to be in effect unless the language of the
constitution by its terms requires a different result;

See Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed 60 (1803).
Section 2 of Article II clearly places legislative authority in the Business
Conraittee to promulgate ordinances covering future membership and the: adoption of
new members.

However, this delegation must be read with the companion delegation

found in Article. YI, Section l(j). This article lists the deleaated powers of
the Business Committee, and Section l(j) states:
(j) To enact resolutions or ordinances, not Inconsistent with Article 11
of this Constitution governing adoption and abandonment of members, and
to keep at all times a correct roll of the members of the Ute Indian Tribe
of the Uintah and Oura}' Reservation, (emphasfis by the Court).
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Since the Constitution must be read as a whole in order to determine 11:>
meaning, it is clear that the provisions of Article VI, Section l(j) must be
read together with those of Article II, Section 2 in order to determine the
extent of the power to legislate which the Constitution has delegated to the
Tribal Business Committee.

Phil brook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713, 44 L.Ed.

2d. 525 (1975); Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. FPC,; 420 U.S. 395, 402-403,
43 L.Ed. 2d. 279 (1975).

The objective is to determine the intent of the

framers of the Constitution and to give effect to their will.
The Court

Id.

has searched in vain for some reasonable theory upon which

defendants1 claims would be substantiated.

If we assume for the purposes of

argument that defendants, contentions.as.to the effect of Section 1 of Article
II are true, then the membership of the'Tribe is defined as a closed class

of

persons identified in that section. There then exists no persons who can be
said to be eligible for membership in the tribe in the absense of an ordinance
or resolution of the Tribal Business Committee establishing the requirements for
membership.

Thus, under Defendants1 theory, new members may only be admitted to

the Tribe by the process of adoption.
The delegated powers of the Tribal Business Committee include the authority
to govern

the adoption of new members,

but only insofar

as that

authority is

exercised "not inconsistent with Article II" of the Constitution.

The term

"inconsistent" is generally defined to mean lacking in agreement in kind, nature
or form, or not holding to the same principles or practice.
Dictionary, Concise Edition (1955),

Webster's New World

Careful reading of Article II reveals that

there are three substantial elements in that article:

(1) a definition of the

The term "adoption" as used to denote the process by which persons can
be admitted to membership in the Tribe, is generally equivalent to the term
"naturalization"--in-non-Indian-law-and practice.—That tenrris -not-used here
to describe the process by which the parent-child relationship is created in
domestic relations law.

requirements for membersmp, U J tne delegation on autnoriLy tu cue

ouimc^

Committee to promulgate ordinances covering" Tuturel membership and the adoption'
of new members, and (3) the requirement for Secretarial review.

Clearly, in

enacting legislation governing adoption, the only Ibasic elements with which
such legislation could conflict would be either ellement (1) membership requirements, or element (3) the requirement for Secretarial review.

We are unpersuaded

that the limiting language of Article VI, Section |l(j) would have been included
simply to provide for Secretarial review.

The clelar majority of the subsections

contained in Article VI, Section 1 call specificaljly for review by the Secretary
of the Interior for action taken by the Business Gorrmittee.

Clearly, this

language could only, have been included with the inltent that the eligibility
requirements contained in Article II should not be abridged.. Even under
defendants1 theory of the case, the Business Commiiitee would not be authorized
by the sovereign to enact and enforce legislation Iwhich prohibited a person .from
becoming a member of the Tribe if such person meet the membership requirements
contained in Article II.
It is clear then that insofar as the blood quantum requirements established
by the Tribal Business Committee are applied in sijch a way as to defeat the
right to membership of a person who meets the requirements for membership
established in Article II, such blood quantum requirements are aDplied without
the authority of the sovereign and the persons applying such requirements are
not entitled to the sovereigns immunity.
decreed

In oth$r words, the sovereign has

in the constitution that those persons meeting the requirements of

Article II, Section 1 are eligible for membership in the Tribe, the sovereign
has not given any agent of. the Tribe the authority to remove cr defeat "that
right, and therefore, any action by an agent.to defeat that right is not an
act of the sovereign but an act of an individual vl/hich this court clearly has
the power and duty to enjoin.
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III.
Defendants1 other assignment of error are without merit.

Although

defendant argues that the United States and the Secretary of the Interior
are indispensible parties immune from the jurisdiction of this Court, the
Secretary was not dismissed below.

Furthermore, the Secretary^ presence is

not necessary to determine the rights of the parties.

Defendants1 contention

that the 1954 Ute distribution act requires that only "full blood" Utes as
defined in that act are now entitled to membership ifc negated by Section 677(d)
as amended which finally states, "New membership in the tribes shall hereafter
be controlled and determined by the constitution and by-laws of the tribe and
ordinances enacted thereunder".

Act of August 27, 1954, Ch 1009, & 5, 68 Stat

868, Act of August 2, 1955, Ch 880, & 1, 70 Stat 93q.

If the Congress had wished

to limit the Tribe's constitutional definition of members when the right of
enrollment and future membership was revitalize_d in 1956, it could have done
expressly.
Defendants1 final contention is that the jurisdiction of this Court to hear
and determine these appeals have been withdrawn by virtue of Ordinance 78-8.
Since we have today held that plaintiffs have a vesfted absolute constitutional
right to enrollment which was in effect prior to the enactment of Ordinance 78-8,
and since that ordinance was enacted after these adtions were filed, application
of said ordinance to these actions would violate tfje provisions of the Ute Indian
Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation even if Ordinance 78-8 would have such
an effect.

IV.

We must now consider P l a i n t i f f s cross appeals in Civil Numbers 133-77, 9-78,
and 11-78 wherein Plaintiffs appeal the failure ofi the Tribal Court to award
attorneys fees to P l a i n t i f f s .

P l a i n t i f f s c i t e 42 IU.S.C-§-1938. as authority
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for an award of attorneys fees.

This section is inapplicable to actions in

the Ute Tribal Court, and this Court adheres to th£ general rule that attorneys
fees are not ordinarily awarded to the prevailing party

from the losing party

in the absence of contract or a specific statute authorizing such an award.
No provision of the Ute Law and Order Code has beefi brought to our attention
which would authorize an award of attorneys fees ifi this case and we decline
to no so.
AFFIRMED, IT IS SO ORDERED

SEPARATE OPINION
Chief Justice Pipestem concuring in part and dissebting in part.
Pipestem, C.J.

Although I concur in Parts I, III, and IV of the opinion of

the majority, I wish to express my separate views regarding the Issue of sovereigi
immunity.

Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.SL 49 (1978), clearly stands for

the proposition that the Ute Tribe is immune from puit.

Since the Tribal

Business Committee clearly constitutes the legislative and executive body of
the tribes it stands cloaked in the immunity of thie tribe insofar as it functions
within its Constitutionally established duties.

This is the precise body whose

functions are entitled to and the beneficiary of t|he immunity described by the
majority.
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